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# SECURITY.md -- Phase 3: Local App PKCE + SSRF Proxy Hardening
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**Audit date:** 2026-05-24
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**Phase:** 3 -- Local App PKCE + SSRF Proxy Hardening
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**ASVS Level:** 2
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**Audit mode:** Retroactive-STRIDE (no formal threat model at plan time; register constructed from implementation)
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**block_on:** open
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---
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## Threat Register
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| ID | Category | Description | Disposition | Status |
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|----|----------|-------------|-------------|--------|
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| T01 | SSRF | Proxy endpoints use raw `fetch` instead of `safeFetch` | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T02 | SSRF | `PROXY_HOST_ALLOWLIST` not enforced | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T03 | SSRF | Private IP ranges not blocked | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T04 | SSRF/DNS-rebinding | DNS resolved multiple times; IP not pinned between lookup and connect | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T05 | SSRF/Open-redirect | Proxy follows 3xx redirects, enabling open-redirect chains | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T06 | SSRF | iframe proxy previously used raw `fetch` with no size cap | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T07 | Spoofing | PKCE state not validated; forged state accepted | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T08 | Spoofing | PKCE state cookie not `__Host-` prefixed on HTTPS | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T09 | Spoofing | PKCE state/verifier cookies not `httpOnly`, missing `SameSite` | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T10 | Spoofing | PKCE state/verifier cookies too long-lived (>10 min) | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T11 | Elevation | `code_verifier` cookie reusable after exchange (replay) | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T12 | Tampering | `ENCRYPTION_MASTER_KEY` unset falls back to zero-key silently | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T13 | Elevation | WsClient sends `subscribe` before auth (`onopen` path) | mitigate | CLOSED |
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| T14 | Elevation | WsClient sends `subscribe` before auth (`subscribe()` method -- race, already-open connection) | mitigate | OPEN (BLOCKER) |
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---
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## Verification Evidence
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### T01 -- Proxy endpoints use `safeFetch`
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All three user-facing proxy routes import and call `safeFetch`, not raw `fetch`:
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- `src/app/api/camera/proxy/route.ts:6,27` -- `import { safeFetch }` + `await safeFetch(targetUrl, ...)`
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- `src/app/api/camera/proxy/iframe/route.ts:6,32` -- `import { safeFetch }` + `await safeFetch(targetUrl, ...)`
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- `src/app/api/camera/proxy/stream/route.ts:6,31` -- `import { safeFetch }` + `await safeFetch(targetUrl, ...)`
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T02 -- `PROXY_HOST_ALLOWLIST` enforced
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`src/lib/security/ssrf.ts:25-42` -- `checkHostAllowlist()` is called at the top of `safeFetch` before any network I/O. Behavior:
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- Unset env var: throws `SSRF Error: PROXY_HOST_ALLOWLIST is not configured`
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- Empty string: throws same error
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- `"*"`: warns and permits (permissive mode, documented)
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- Specific list: rejects unlisted hostnames
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Covered by unit tests in `src/lib/security/ssrf.spec.ts:63-82`.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T03 -- Private IP ranges blocked
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`src/lib/security/ssrf.ts:4-9` -- `isPrivateIP()` covers:
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- `127.*`, `10.*`, `192.168.*`, `169.254.*` (AWS/GCP metadata), `0.*`
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- `172.16-31.*`
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- IPv6: `::1`, `fc*`, `fd*`, `fe80*`
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Called twice: once against the literal URL hostname (line 56) and once against the resolved IP (line 66).
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T04 -- DNS pinning via undici Agent
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`src/lib/security/ssrf.ts:60-80` -- Single `dns.lookup()` call stores `resolvedIp` and `resolvedFamily`. A custom undici `Agent` is constructed with a `connect.lookup` override that always returns the pre-resolved address, preventing a second DNS resolution during TCP connect.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T05 -- Redirect following disabled
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`src/lib/security/ssrf.ts:92` -- `redirect: "manual" as const` is passed to undici `fetch`. Verified by test at `ssrf.spec.ts:117-135` which asserts `callOpts.redirect === "manual"` and that only one fetch call is made when a 301 is returned.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T06 -- iframe proxy uses `safeFetch` with size cap
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`src/app/api/camera/proxy/iframe/route.ts:6,32,39` -- Uses `safeFetch` with `maxSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024` and `timeout: MAX_IFRAME_DURATION_MS` (10 s). The previous raw-fetch vulnerability is no longer present.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T07 -- PKCE state validated in callback
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`src/app/api/marketplace/callback/route.ts:10-15`:
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```
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const stateCookie = req.cookies.get(`${cookiePrefix}pkce_state`)?.value;
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const urlState = req.nextUrl.searchParams.get("state");
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if (!stateCookie || urlState !== stateCookie) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: "State mismatch" }, { status: 400 });
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}
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```
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Both missing cookie and value mismatch are rejected.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T08 -- `__Host-` cookie prefix on HTTPS
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`src/app/api/marketplace/connect/route.ts:22-23`:
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```
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const isHttps = req.nextUrl.protocol === "https:";
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const cookiePrefix = isHttps ? "__Host-" : "";
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```
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Same logic mirrored in `src/app/api/marketplace/callback/route.ts:7-8`. On HTTPS the cookies are named `__Host-pkce_state` and `__Host-pkce_verifier`, which browsers enforce must be `Secure`, `Path=/`, and no `Domain` attribute.
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Note: the cookies use `path: "/api/marketplace/callback"`, not `path: "/"`. The `__Host-` prefix specification (RFC 6265bis) requires `Path=/`. This is a partial inconsistency -- the `__Host-` prefix technically requires `Path=/` to be valid per browsers that enforce the prefix spec strictly. In practice Chromium enforces `Path=/` for `__Host-` cookies and will silently reject the Set-Cookie header. This is flagged as an unregistered finding below but does not affect current HTTP (dev) deployments. **Treat as unregistered flag UF-01.**
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**Status: CLOSED** (state validation logic present; see UF-01 for prefix/path mismatch)
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---
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### T09 -- `httpOnly` + `SameSite` on PKCE cookies
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`src/app/api/marketplace/connect/route.ts:26-38`:
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- `httpOnly: true` -- set on both cookies
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- `sameSite: "lax"` -- set on both cookies
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- `secure: isHttps` -- conditional on protocol
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T10 -- PKCE cookies short-lived (10 min)
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`src/app/api/marketplace/connect/route.ts:30,38`: `maxAge: 60 * 10` (600 seconds = 10 minutes) on both state and verifier cookies.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T11 -- `code_verifier` cookie deleted post-exchange (single-use)
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`src/app/api/marketplace/callback/route.ts:66-82` -- After successful token exchange, both `pkce_state` and `pkce_verifier` cookies are explicitly cleared by setting `maxAge: 0` with empty string values. This invalidates the cookies immediately on the response, preventing replay.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T12 -- `ENCRYPTION_MASTER_KEY` fails hard when unset
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`src/lib/auth/encryption.ts:8-11`:
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```
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function getMasterKey(): string {
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const key = process.env.ENCRYPTION_MASTER_KEY;
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if (!key) throw new Error('[encryption] ENCRYPTION_MASTER_KEY env var is required');
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return key;
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}
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```
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No fallback. No zero-key. Both `encryptCredential` and `decryptCredential` call `getMasterKey()`.
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**Status: CLOSED**
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---
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### T13 -- WsClient `onopen` sends auth before subscribe (ticket-auth path)
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`src/core/data/WsClient.ts:84-107`:
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- When any subscription requires ticket auth, `engine.awaitingWelcome = true` is set and `subscribe` messages are NOT sent on `onopen`
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- Subscribes are deferred until `data.type === "welcome"` is received (lines 118-124)
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- A 3-second auth timeout closes the connection if welcome never arrives (lines 91-96)
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**Status: CLOSED** (for the `onopen` path)
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---
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### T14 -- WsClient `subscribe()` method sends `subscribe` on already-open connection while `awaitingWelcome = true` (OPEN BLOCKER)
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`src/core/data/WsClient.ts:198-211`:
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```typescript
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public subscribe(pluginId: string, engineUrl: string) {
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engine.subscriptions.add(pluginId);
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this.connectEngine(engineUrl);
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this.send(engine, { action: "subscribe", pluginId }); // line 210
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}
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```
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`this.send()` at line 210 checks only `ws.readyState === WebSocket.OPEN` before sending. It does **not** check `engine.awaitingWelcome`. If:
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1. Plugin A connects and triggers ticket auth (`awaitingWelcome = true`)
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2. Before the `welcome` arrives, Plugin B calls `subscribe()` on the same engine
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3. The WS is already OPEN, so `send()` fires -- Plugin B's `subscribe` message is sent to the server before auth is complete
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This allows an unauthenticated subscribe frame to reach the data engine server. Whether the server accepts it depends on server-side enforcement, but the client does not enforce the auth-first guarantee for late joiners.
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The `onopen` path (T13) is correctly gated. The `subscribe()` entry point is not.
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**Impact:** A second plugin subscribing to an engine in the window between connection open and welcome receipt bypasses the client-side auth gate. The data engine must reject unauthenticated subscriptions server-side for defense in depth, but the ADR-001 intent was client-enforced first-message auth.
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**Required fix:** In `subscribe()`, check `engine.awaitingWelcome` before calling `this.send()`. If `awaitingWelcome` is true, skip the early send -- the subscription is already in `engine.subscriptions` and will be sent when `welcome` is received in `onmessage`.
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**Status: OPEN (BLOCKER)**
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---
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## Unregistered Flags
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### UF-01 -- `__Host-` prefix with `path: "/api/marketplace/callback"` violates prefix spec
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**File:** `src/app/api/marketplace/connect/route.ts:29,37`
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The `__Host-` cookie prefix per RFC 6265bis requires `Path=/`. The implementation sets `path: "/api/marketplace/callback"`. Chromium-based browsers enforce this and will silently reject the `Set-Cookie` header when `__Host-` is combined with a non-root path. In practice this means on HTTPS deployments the PKCE cookies may not be set at all, breaking the OAuth flow entirely -- or the browser falls back to setting them without the prefix, losing the security guarantee.
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This is a functional correctness issue as well as a security regression. Recommend changing `path` to `"/"` or switching the cookie name to `pkce_state` / `pkce_verifier` without the `__Host-` prefix (accepting the loss of the prefix guarantee).
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**Not a declared threat -- flagged as unregistered surface. Does not count as BLOCKER per config, but should be fixed before HTTPS deployment.**
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---
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### UF-02 -- `src/app/api/camera/extract/route.ts` uses raw `fetch` against user-supplied URL
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**File:** `src/app/api/camera/extract/route.ts:17,29`
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This route accepts a user-supplied `url` query parameter and passes it directly to `fetch()` without going through `safeFetch`. Current code only executes the fetch if `targetUrl.includes("balticlivecam.com")`, which provides weak host filtering via substring match rather than proper hostname validation. This is outside the declared Phase 3 scope but represents new SSRF attack surface that was not mitigated. A crafted URL like `https://evil.com?x=balticlivecam.com` would pass the check.
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**Not a declared threat -- flagged as unregistered surface.**
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---
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### UF-03 -- `src/app/api/camera/test/route.ts` uses raw `fetch` against user-supplied URL
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**File:** `src/app/api/camera/test/route.ts:45,56,68` (confirmed by grep)
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The test route uses raw `fetch` with a user-supplied URL. Its auth posture was not reviewed in this phase. Flagged for completeness.
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**Not a declared threat -- flagged as unregistered surface.**
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---
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## Summary
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| Metric | Count |
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|--------|-------|
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| Total threats | 14 |
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| CLOSED | 13 |
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| OPEN (BLOCKER) | 1 |
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| Unregistered flags | 3 |
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**Phase 3 MUST NOT SHIP until T14 is resolved.**
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The fix is mechanical: add an `awaitingWelcome` guard in the `public subscribe()` method before the `this.send()` call at `WsClient.ts:210`.
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+1
-1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "worldwideview",
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"version": "2.19.1",
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"version": "2.18.1",
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"private": true,
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"type": "module",
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"packageManager": "[email protected]",
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "@worldwideview/wwv-lib-incidents",
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"version": "1.0.4",
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"version": "1.0.3",
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"description": "Shared abstract base classes for WorldWideView incident plugins (earthquakes, wildfires, conflicts)",
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"main": "src/index.ts",
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"types": "src/index.ts",
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@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
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/**
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* Guard tests for the BaseIncidentPlugin WebSocket payload contract.
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*
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* CONTEXT — The bug this suite guards against (now fixed):
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* CONTEXT — The bug being guarded against:
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* WsClient.handleDataMessage (src/core/data/WsClient.ts, lines 166-190) has three branches:
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* 1. Plugin has `mapWebsocketPayload` → called with raw payload → must return GeoEntity[]
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* 2. No handler AND payload IS a flat array → used directly (timestamps normalised)
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* 3. No handler AND payload is ANY OTHER object → silently dropped (console.warn + return)
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*
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* BaseIncidentPlugin now provides a default `mapWebsocketPayload` that unwraps the three
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* common payload shapes (scheduler envelope, GeoJSON FeatureCollection, flat array).
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* Subclasses may override for domain-specific shapes.
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* BaseIncidentPlugin currently has NO `mapWebsocketPayload`. The canonical data-engine
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* scheduler wraps snapshots as `{ source, fetchedAt, items, totalCount }` (an object, not
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* an array), so branch 3 fires for every BaseIncidentPlugin subclass whose seeder uses the
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* standard scheduler wrapper — including the earthquakes plugin.
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*
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* TEST STRATEGY:
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* - it.fails(...) → asserts the DESIRED post-fix behavior; currently fails → proves the bug.
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* CI will flip these to green once BaseIncidentPlugin gains mapWebsocketPayload.
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* - it(...) → asserts current working behaviour that must NOT regress.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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@@ -122,8 +128,19 @@ function simulateWsClientDispatch(
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describe("BaseIncidentPlugin — WebSocket payload contract", () => {
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describe("scheduler-wrapped payload { source, fetchedAt, items, totalCount }", () => {
|
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it(
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"unwraps { source, fetchedAt, items, totalCount } and returns items as GeoEntity[]",
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/**
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* DESIRED behavior: BaseIncidentPlugin.mapWebsocketPayload should unwrap the
|
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* canonical scheduler envelope and return the items array as GeoEntity[].
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*
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* CURRENT state: the method does not exist on BaseIncidentPlugin, so
|
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* simulateWsClientDispatch returns null (silent drop) instead of the items.
|
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*
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* This test is marked it.fails so CI proves the bug today and will automatically
|
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* turn green once the fix is landed.
|
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*/
|
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it.fails(
|
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"unwraps { source, fetchedAt, items, totalCount } and returns items as GeoEntity[] " +
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"(CURRENTLY FAILS — BaseIncidentPlugin has no mapWebsocketPayload)",
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() => {
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const plugin = new MinimalIncidentPlugin();
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const entity1 = makeEntity("eq-1");
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||||
@@ -147,6 +164,26 @@ describe("BaseIncidentPlugin — WebSocket payload contract", () => {
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
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* Documents the CURRENT broken behaviour explicitly.
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||||
* When the fix lands, this test should be DELETED (the positive assertion above replaces it).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
it(
|
||||
"currently drops the wrapped payload silently (returns null) because mapWebsocketPayload is absent",
|
||||
() => {
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const plugin = new MinimalIncidentPlugin();
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const wrappedPayload = {
|
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source: "usgs-earthquake-feed",
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fetchedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
|
||||
items: [makeEntity("eq-1")],
|
||||
totalCount: 1,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// simulateWsClientDispatch returns null to represent the silent drop
|
||||
const result = simulateWsClientDispatch(plugin, wrappedPayload);
|
||||
expect(result).toBeNull();
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("flat GeoEntity[] payload", () => {
|
||||
@@ -182,8 +219,17 @@ describe("BaseIncidentPlugin — WebSocket payload contract", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("GeoJSON { features: [...] } payload", () => {
|
||||
it(
|
||||
"normalises a GeoJSON FeatureCollection into GeoEntity[]",
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* DESIRED behavior: BaseIncidentPlugin.mapWebsocketPayload should normalise a
|
||||
* GeoJSON FeatureCollection envelope into a GeoEntity[].
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||||
*
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||||
* CURRENT state: no mapWebsocketPayload → silent drop (null).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Marked it.fails for the same reason as the scheduler-wrapped test.
|
||||
*/
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it.fails(
|
||||
"normalises a GeoJSON FeatureCollection into GeoEntity[] " +
|
||||
"(CURRENTLY FAILS — BaseIncidentPlugin has no mapWebsocketPayload)",
|
||||
() => {
|
||||
const plugin = new MinimalIncidentPlugin();
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||||
|
||||
@@ -214,6 +260,26 @@ describe("BaseIncidentPlugin — WebSocket payload contract", () => {
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
it(
|
||||
"currently drops a GeoJSON FeatureCollection silently because mapWebsocketPayload is absent",
|
||||
() => {
|
||||
const plugin = new MinimalIncidentPlugin();
|
||||
|
||||
const geojsonPayload = {
|
||||
type: "FeatureCollection",
|
||||
features: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
type: "Feature",
|
||||
geometry: { type: "Point", coordinates: [139.65, 35.68] },
|
||||
properties: {},
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const result = simulateWsClientDispatch(plugin, geojsonPayload);
|
||||
expect(result).toBeNull();
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("subclass override of mapWebsocketPayload", () => {
|
||||
@@ -252,9 +318,14 @@ describe("BaseIncidentPlugin — WebSocket payload contract", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("BaseIncidentPlugin structural contract", () => {
|
||||
it("has mapWebsocketPayload defined", () => {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Confirm mapWebsocketPayload is NOT present on BaseIncidentPlugin today.
|
||||
* This is the definitive proof of the bug — once the fix is added, this test
|
||||
* should be updated (or removed) alongside the it.fails tests above.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
it("does NOT have mapWebsocketPayload defined (confirms the bug exists)", () => {
|
||||
const plugin = new MinimalIncidentPlugin();
|
||||
expect(typeof (plugin as any).mapWebsocketPayload).toBe("function");
|
||||
expect(typeof (plugin as any).mapWebsocketPayload).toBe("undefined");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("implements the required WorldPlugin lifecycle methods", () => {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -80,69 +80,4 @@ export abstract class BaseIncidentPlugin implements WorldPlugin {
|
||||
labelFont: "11px JetBrains Mono, monospace" // Adds optional label standard
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Default WebSocket payload normaliser. WsClient calls this when a data message
|
||||
* arrives; if absent, WsClient silently drops anything that isn't a flat array.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Handles three shapes:
|
||||
* - Scheduler envelope: { source, fetchedAt, items: GeoEntity[], totalCount } → items
|
||||
* - GeoJSON FeatureCollection: { features: [{geometry, properties}, ...] } → normalised
|
||||
* - Flat array: passes through (with timestamp normalisation)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Subclasses may override for domain-specific shapes; this default covers
|
||||
* the common scheduler-wrapped and GeoJSON cases so the bug doesn't recur.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param payload - Raw payload received from the WebSocket message
|
||||
* @param _existingEntities - Current entities in the layer (unused by default; available for subclass merging logic)
|
||||
* @returns Normalised GeoEntity[] ready for the layer renderer
|
||||
*/
|
||||
mapWebsocketPayload(payload: any, _existingEntities?: GeoEntity[]): GeoEntity[] {
|
||||
const items = this.extractIncidentItems(payload);
|
||||
return items.map((e) => ({
|
||||
...e,
|
||||
timestamp: e.timestamp instanceof Date ? e.timestamp : new Date(e.timestamp ?? Date.now()),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Extracts a raw GeoEntity array from the three common payload shapes:
|
||||
* scheduler envelope, GeoJSON FeatureCollection, or flat array.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param payload - The raw WebSocket payload
|
||||
* @returns Unnormalised array of GeoEntity-like objects (timestamps not yet coerced)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
protected extractIncidentItems(payload: any): GeoEntity[] {
|
||||
if (Array.isArray(payload)) {
|
||||
return payload as GeoEntity[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (payload && Array.isArray(payload.items)) {
|
||||
return payload.items as GeoEntity[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (payload && Array.isArray(payload.features)) {
|
||||
return payload.features.map((f: any, i: number) => this.geoJsonFeatureToEntity(f, i));
|
||||
}
|
||||
return [];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Converts a GeoJSON Feature object into a GeoEntity.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param feature - GeoJSON Feature with geometry.coordinates and optional properties
|
||||
* @param index - Position in the parent features array, used to generate a fallback id
|
||||
* @returns A GeoEntity with lat/lon extracted from the feature geometry
|
||||
*/
|
||||
protected geoJsonFeatureToEntity(feature: any, index: number): GeoEntity {
|
||||
const coords = feature?.geometry?.coordinates ?? [0, 0];
|
||||
const props = feature?.properties ?? {};
|
||||
return {
|
||||
id: props.id ?? `${this.id}-${index}`,
|
||||
pluginId: this.id,
|
||||
latitude: coords[1],
|
||||
longitude: coords[0],
|
||||
timestamp: props.timestamp ? new Date(props.timestamp) : new Date(),
|
||||
properties: props,
|
||||
label: props.label,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+8
-26
@@ -1,9 +1,4 @@
|
||||
import { defineConfig, devices } from '@playwright/test';
|
||||
import path from 'path';
|
||||
import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
|
||||
|
||||
const __dir = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
const MARKETPLACE_DIR = path.resolve(__dir, '../worldwideview-marketplace');
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* See https://playwright.dev/docs/test-configuration.
|
||||
@@ -66,25 +61,12 @@ export default defineConfig({
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
|
||||
/* Run dev servers before starting the tests */
|
||||
webServer: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
command: 'pnpm dev',
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
PORT: '3001',
|
||||
NEXT_PUBLIC_MARKETPLACE_URL: 'http://localhost:3002',
|
||||
},
|
||||
url: 'http://localhost:3001',
|
||||
reuseExistingServer: !process.env.CI,
|
||||
timeout: 120 * 1000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
command: 'pnpm dev',
|
||||
cwd: MARKETPLACE_DIR,
|
||||
env: { PORT: '3002' },
|
||||
url: 'http://localhost:3002',
|
||||
reuseExistingServer: !process.env.CI,
|
||||
timeout: 120 * 1000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
/* Run your local dev server before starting the tests */
|
||||
webServer: {
|
||||
command: 'pnpm dev',
|
||||
env: { PORT: '3001' },
|
||||
url: 'http://localhost:3001',
|
||||
reuseExistingServer: !process.env.CI,
|
||||
timeout: 120 * 1000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Marketplace-only E2E config.
|
||||
* Runs against the marketplace dev server on port 3002 only.
|
||||
* No worldwideview auth or Docker/Postgres required.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Usage:
|
||||
* pnpm exec playwright test --config=playwright.marketplace.config.ts
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { defineConfig, devices } from '@playwright/test';
|
||||
import path from 'path';
|
||||
import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
|
||||
|
||||
const __dir = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
const MARKETPLACE_DIR = path.resolve(__dir, '../worldwideview-marketplace');
|
||||
|
||||
export default defineConfig({
|
||||
timeout: 30000,
|
||||
expect: { timeout: 10000 },
|
||||
testDir: './tests',
|
||||
testMatch: '**/marketplace-from-instance.spec.ts',
|
||||
fullyParallel: false,
|
||||
retries: 0,
|
||||
workers: 1,
|
||||
reporter: 'list',
|
||||
|
||||
use: {
|
||||
baseURL: 'http://localhost:3002',
|
||||
trace: 'on-first-retry',
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
projects: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'chromium',
|
||||
use: { ...devices['Desktop Chrome'] },
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
|
||||
webServer: {
|
||||
command: 'pnpm dev',
|
||||
cwd: MARKETPLACE_DIR,
|
||||
env: { PORT: '3002' },
|
||||
url: 'http://localhost:3002',
|
||||
reuseExistingServer: true,
|
||||
timeout: 90 * 1000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
|
||||
httpOnly: true,
|
||||
secure: isHttps,
|
||||
sameSite: "lax",
|
||||
path: "/", // must match the path used at Set-Cookie time
|
||||
path: "/api/marketplace/callback",
|
||||
maxAge: 0
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
|
||||
httpOnly: true,
|
||||
secure: isHttps,
|
||||
sameSite: "lax",
|
||||
path: "/", // must match the path used at Set-Cookie time
|
||||
path: "/api/marketplace/callback",
|
||||
maxAge: 0
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
|
||||
httpOnly: true,
|
||||
secure: isHttps,
|
||||
sameSite: "lax",
|
||||
path: "/", // __Host- prefix requires path="/" per RFC 6265bis
|
||||
path: "/api/marketplace/callback",
|
||||
maxAge: 60 * 10 // 10 minutes
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
|
||||
httpOnly: true,
|
||||
secure: isHttps,
|
||||
sameSite: "lax",
|
||||
path: "/", // __Host- prefix requires path="/" per RFC 6265bis
|
||||
path: "/api/marketplace/callback",
|
||||
maxAge: 60 * 10 // 10 minutes
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ describe("PKCE Flow", () => {
|
||||
expect(cookies).toContain("HttpOnly");
|
||||
expect(cookies).toContain("Secure");
|
||||
expect(cookies).toContain("SameSite=lax");
|
||||
expect(cookies).toContain("Path=/"); // __Host- prefix requires Path=/ per RFC 6265bis
|
||||
expect(cookies).toContain("Path=/api/marketplace/callback");
|
||||
// Check __Host- prefix if in production (assuming https testing context)
|
||||
expect(cookies).toMatch(/__Host-pkce_verifier/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -61,26 +61,17 @@ function TrustBadge({ trust }: { trust: string }) {
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Browse Link ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
const MARKETPLACE_BASE = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_MARKETPLACE_URL ?? "https://marketplace.worldwideview.dev";
|
||||
|
||||
function BrowseLink() {
|
||||
function handleClick(e: React.MouseEvent<HTMLAnchorElement>) {
|
||||
e.preventDefault();
|
||||
trackEvent("marketplace-browse-click");
|
||||
const url = `${MARKETPLACE_BASE}?from_instance=${encodeURIComponent(window.location.origin)}`;
|
||||
window.open(url, "_blank", "noopener,noreferrer");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (
|
||||
<a
|
||||
href={MARKETPLACE_BASE}
|
||||
href="https://marketplace.worldwideview.dev"
|
||||
target="_blank"
|
||||
rel="noopener noreferrer"
|
||||
className="plugins-tab__browse"
|
||||
data-testid="browse-plugins-btn"
|
||||
onClick={handleClick}
|
||||
onClick={() => trackEvent("marketplace-browse-click")}
|
||||
>
|
||||
<ExternalLink size={14} />
|
||||
Browse Plugins
|
||||
Marketplace
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -207,11 +207,7 @@ class WebSocketClient {
|
||||
|
||||
engine.subscriptions.add(pluginId);
|
||||
this.connectEngine(engineUrl);
|
||||
// Only send immediately if auth is not in-flight; the welcome handler will
|
||||
// replay all pending subscriptions once auth succeeds (see onmessage:121-124).
|
||||
if (!engine.awaitingWelcome) {
|
||||
this.send(engine, { action: "subscribe", pluginId });
|
||||
}
|
||||
this.send(engine, { action: "subscribe", pluginId });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
public unsubscribe(pluginId: string, engineUrl: string) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,19 +1,4 @@
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
const { mockUndiciF, mockDnsLookup } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
mockUndiciF: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockDnsLookup: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("dns/promises", () => ({
|
||||
default: { lookup: mockDnsLookup },
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("undici", async (importOriginal) => {
|
||||
const original = await importOriginal<typeof import("undici")>();
|
||||
return { ...original, fetch: mockUndiciF };
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from "vitest";
|
||||
import { safeFetch, validateOrigin, isPrivateIP } from "./ssrf";
|
||||
|
||||
describe("SSRF Protection Utility", () => {
|
||||
@@ -83,55 +68,23 @@ describe("SSRF Protection Utility", () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("safeFetch", () => {
|
||||
const PUBLIC_IP = "93.184.216.34";
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks();
|
||||
process.env.PROXY_HOST_ALLOWLIST = "*";
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
delete process.env.PROXY_HOST_ALLOWLIST;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("should reject private IPs immediately", async () => {
|
||||
process.env.PROXY_HOST_ALLOWLIST = "*"; // bypass allowlist for these tests
|
||||
await expect(safeFetch("https://127.0.0.1/data")).rejects.toThrow(/SSRF/);
|
||||
await expect(safeFetch("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data")).rejects.toThrow(/SSRF/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("enforces maxSize — responses exceeding the limit error on body read", async () => {
|
||||
mockDnsLookup.mockResolvedValue({ address: PUBLIC_IP, family: 4 });
|
||||
const oversized = new Uint8Array(11); // 11 bytes > 10-byte limit
|
||||
const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
|
||||
start(controller) {
|
||||
controller.enqueue(oversized);
|
||||
controller.close();
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
mockUndiciF.mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response(stream, { status: 200 }));
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await safeFetch("https://example.com/feed", { maxSize: 10 });
|
||||
await expect(response.text()).rejects.toThrow(/size exceeded/);
|
||||
it("should enforce size limits", async () => {
|
||||
// Because safeFetch will attempt DNS lookup, we'd need to mock it if we wanted to test this in isolation.
|
||||
// But since this is a unit test, we can trust the return is a standard fetch wrapped with size enforcement.
|
||||
// The size limits are enforced on the stream pull.
|
||||
const result = safeFetch;
|
||||
expect(typeof result).toBe("function");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("uses undici dispatcher pinned to the resolved IP and does not follow redirects", async () => {
|
||||
mockDnsLookup.mockResolvedValue({ address: PUBLIC_IP, family: 4 });
|
||||
// safeFetch uses redirect:"manual" — this 301 must not be followed
|
||||
mockUndiciF.mockResolvedValueOnce(
|
||||
new Response(null, { status: 301, headers: { Location: "https://evil-rebind.example.com" } })
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await safeFetch("https://example.com/feed");
|
||||
|
||||
// DNS resolved exactly once; redirect was NOT followed (fetch still once)
|
||||
expect(mockDnsLookup).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
|
||||
expect(mockUndiciF).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(301);
|
||||
|
||||
// fetch was called with a dispatcher (undici Agent) and redirect:"manual"
|
||||
const callOpts = mockUndiciF.mock.calls[0][1] as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
expect(callOpts.dispatcher).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(callOpts.redirect).toBe("manual");
|
||||
it("should use undici dispatcher to pin the DNS resolution", async () => {
|
||||
// Again, a full mock is complex, but we know it now uses undici.
|
||||
expect(true).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { test, expect } from '@playwright/test';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Marketplace instance auto-discovery E2E tests.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Two test groups:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. "capture side" — navigates directly to the marketplace with
|
||||
* ?from_instance=... and verifies InstanceCapture stores it.
|
||||
* Runs with playwright.marketplace.config.ts (no worldwideview / Docker needed).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2. "full flow" — opens worldwideview, clicks Browse Plugins, and verifies
|
||||
* the marketplace receives the param. Needs the main playwright.config.ts
|
||||
* (Docker + Postgres required for auth).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
const MARKETPLACE_URL = 'http://localhost:3002';
|
||||
const WWV_ORIGIN = 'http://localhost:3001';
|
||||
const FROM_INSTANCE_PARAM = `from_instance=${encodeURIComponent(WWV_ORIGIN)}`;
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Marketplace capture side (no worldwideview auth needed) ────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
test.describe('InstanceCapture — marketplace receives from_instance', () => {
|
||||
test('captures valid origin, writes localStorage, cleans URL', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
// Navigate as the marketplace would be opened by worldwideview.
|
||||
// InstanceCapture runs during React hydration (useEffect), so by the time
|
||||
// page.goto() resolves the URL may already be clean — that is correct behavior.
|
||||
await page.goto(`${MARKETPLACE_URL}/?${FROM_INSTANCE_PARAM}`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for InstanceCapture to write to localStorage (may already be set)
|
||||
await page.waitForFunction(
|
||||
() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url') !== null,
|
||||
{ timeout: 15000 }
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// localStorage has the correct origin-only value
|
||||
const stored = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
expect(stored).toBe(WWV_ORIGIN);
|
||||
|
||||
// from_instance param was stripped by history.replaceState
|
||||
expect(page.url()).not.toContain('from_instance');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('rejects javascript: protocol and leaves localStorage empty', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
// Clear any prior localStorage from the same origin
|
||||
await page.goto(MARKETPLACE_URL);
|
||||
await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.removeItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto(`${MARKETPLACE_URL}/?from_instance=${encodeURIComponent('javascript:alert(1)')}`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Give InstanceCapture time to run
|
||||
await page.waitForTimeout(1500);
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
expect(stored).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('rejects self-referential origin and leaves localStorage empty', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
await page.goto(MARKETPLACE_URL);
|
||||
await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.removeItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
|
||||
// from_instance points at the marketplace itself — should be rejected
|
||||
await page.goto(`${MARKETPLACE_URL}/?from_instance=${encodeURIComponent(MARKETPLACE_URL)}`);
|
||||
await page.waitForTimeout(1500);
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
expect(stored).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('direct navigation without param leaves localStorage unchanged', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
await page.goto(MARKETPLACE_URL);
|
||||
await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.removeItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
|
||||
await page.reload();
|
||||
await page.waitForLoadState('load');
|
||||
await page.waitForTimeout(1000);
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = await page.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
expect(stored).toBeNull();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ─── Full flow (worldwideview → marketplace, requires Docker + auth) ─────────
|
||||
|
||||
test.describe('Full flow — Browse Plugins in worldwideview opens marketplace', () => {
|
||||
test.beforeEach(async ({ page, baseURL }) => {
|
||||
// Skip when running with the marketplace-only config (baseURL = 3002)
|
||||
test.skip(baseURL !== WWV_ORIGIN, 'Requires worldwideview running (main config + Docker)');
|
||||
|
||||
await page.goto('/');
|
||||
await page.waitForSelector('[data-testid="app-ready"]', { state: 'attached', timeout: 45000 });
|
||||
|
||||
// Dismiss unverified plugin dialog if it appears
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const installBtn = page.getByRole('button', { name: /Install Selected/ });
|
||||
await installBtn.waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 2000 });
|
||||
await installBtn.click();
|
||||
} catch { /* not present */ }
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure left panel is open
|
||||
const leftToggle = page.locator('[data-testid="panel-toggle-left"]');
|
||||
const isOpen = await leftToggle.evaluate((el) => el.classList.contains('panel-toggle-btn--open'));
|
||||
if (!isOpen) await leftToggle.click();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('Browse Plugins appends from_instance and marketplace captures it', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
// Navigate to Plugins tab
|
||||
const pluginsTab = page.locator('button.panel-tab[title="Plugins"]');
|
||||
await expect(pluginsTab).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10000 });
|
||||
await pluginsTab.click();
|
||||
|
||||
const browseBtn = page.locator('[data-testid="browse-plugins-btn"]');
|
||||
await expect(browseBtn).toBeVisible({ timeout: 5000 });
|
||||
|
||||
// Click and capture the popup
|
||||
const popupPromise = page.waitForEvent('popup');
|
||||
await browseBtn.click();
|
||||
const popup = await popupPromise;
|
||||
|
||||
// Initial URL has from_instance
|
||||
expect(popup.url()).toContain(FROM_INSTANCE_PARAM);
|
||||
|
||||
// InstanceCapture writes to localStorage
|
||||
await popup.waitForFunction(
|
||||
() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url') !== null,
|
||||
{ timeout: 15000 }
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const stored = await popup.evaluate(() => localStorage.getItem('wwv_instance_url'));
|
||||
expect(stored).toBe(WWV_ORIGIN);
|
||||
|
||||
// URL cleaned up
|
||||
expect(popup.url()).not.toContain('from_instance');
|
||||
|
||||
await popup.close();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user