ssh/tailssh: validate accepted env values, deny GLIBC_TUNABLES, cap names

GLIBC_TUNABLES is parsed by glibc in root su/login environments with
AT_SECURE=0 (CVE-2023-4911 class); add it to the dangerous-env-var
denylist next to its GCONV_PATH/LOCPATH siblings.

The TERM/LANG/LC_* pairs accepted without policy (OpenSSH's default
AcceptEnv) had unvalidated values that reach root-exec'd login/su
environments, where glibc treats path-like locale names as locale-data
paths and leading dashes as its own options. Reject path- and
option-like values (and NUL, which would truncate on exec) instead of
trying to sanitize them.

Also cap accepted env var names at 256 bytes before any wildcard
matching, bounding the matcher input and the child's "su -w" allowlist;
real names are short (LOGIN_NAME_MAX).

Updates tailscale/corp#50380

Signed-off-by: James Tucker <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
James Tucker authored and James Tucker committed 2026-10-24 13:55:35 -07:00
1 parent d484ac300e
commit ff3bb58830
4 files changed
+66 -7

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+21 -5
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@@ -17,15 +17,18 @@ import (
// even when a wildcard acceptEnv pattern like "*" is configured.
//
// The denylist also covers other root su/login environment exposure
// classes: glibc module/file lookups (GCONV_PATH, LOCPATH, NLSPATH) that
// can load attacker-controlled files into privileged processes, and
// resolver configuration (HOSTALIASES, RES_OPTIONS) that can redirect
// privileged hostname lookups.
// classes: glibc module/file lookups and tunables parsing
// (GCONV_PATH, LOCPATH, NLSPATH, GLIBC_TUNABLES; CVE-2023-4911 class —
// glibc parses tunables in root su/login environments with
// AT_SECURE=0) that can load attacker-controlled files or code into
// privileged processes, and resolver configuration (HOSTALIASES,
// RES_OPTIONS) that can redirect privileged hostname lookups.
func isDangerousEnvVar(name string) bool {
upper := strings.ToUpper(name)
return strings.HasPrefix(upper, "LD_") || strings.HasPrefix(upper, "DYLD_") ||
upper == "GOTRACEBACK" || upper == "GCONV_PATH" || upper == "LOCPATH" ||
upper == "NLSPATH" || upper == "HOSTALIASES" || upper == "RES_OPTIONS"
upper == "NLSPATH" || upper == "HOSTALIASES" || upper == "RES_OPTIONS" ||
upper == "GLIBC_TUNABLES"
}
// forbiddenEnvKey reports whether name must never be accepted from the client as a
@@ -42,6 +45,12 @@ func forbiddenEnvKey(name string) bool {
return name == ""
}
// maxAcceptEnvNameLen caps the length of an accepted environment variable
// name. Names are short (LOGIN_NAME_MAX is 256 on Linux); a longer "name"
// is bogus and would only serve to tie up the pattern matcher or bloat the
// child's "su -w" allowlist.
const maxAcceptEnvNameLen = 256
// filterEnv filters a passed in environ string slice (a slice with strings
// representing environment variables in the form "key=value") based on
// the supplied slice of acceptEnv values.
@@ -69,6 +78,13 @@ func filterEnv(acceptEnv []string, environ []string) ([]string, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(`invalid environment variable: %q. Variables must be in "KEY=VALUE" format`, envPair)
}
// Bound the matcher and allowlist input: names are short
// (LOGIN_NAME_MAX), so a longer one is bogus. Reject before any
// wildcard matching runs.
if len(variableName) > maxAcceptEnvNameLen {
continue
}
// Reject NUL bytes: envp entries are NUL-terminated, so a NUL would silently truncate on exec
if strings.Contains(envPair, "\x00") {
continue
+11
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@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ func TestIsDangerousEnvVar(t *testing.T) {
{"hostaliases", true},
{"RES_OPTIONS", true},
{"res_options", true},
{"GLIBC_TUNABLES", true},
{"glibc_tunables", true},
{"TERM", false},
{"LANG", false},
{"LC_ALL", false},
@@ -276,6 +278,15 @@ func TestFilterEnv(t *testing.T) {
environ: []string{"MY VAR=1", "WEIRD\tNAME=2", "MY.VAR=3", "MY-VAR=ok", "B\xc3\xa4R=5", "MY_VAR=ok2"},
expectedFiltered: []string{"MY-VAR=ok", "MY_VAR=ok2"},
},
{
// Names are capped at 256 bytes, even when the pattern would
// match: real names are short, longer ones only tie up the
// matcher or bloat the child's "su -w" allowlist.
name: "oversized-name-rejected",
acceptEnv: []string{"*"},
environ: []string{strings.Repeat("A", maxAcceptEnvNameLen) + "=x", strings.Repeat("B", maxAcceptEnvNameLen+1) + "=x", "GOOD=1"},
expectedFiltered: []string{strings.Repeat("A", maxAcceptEnvNameLen) + "=x", "GOOD=1"},
},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
+17 -2
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@@ -1167,12 +1167,27 @@ func updateStringInSlice(ss []string, a, b string) {
// acceptEnvPair reports whether the environment variable key=value pair
// should be accepted from the client. It uses the same default as OpenSSH
// AcceptEnv.
//
// The value reaches root-exec'd login/su environments, where glibc treats
// a LANG/LC_* value containing "/" as a path to locale data and a leading
// "-" as its own options; TERM is a terminal capability name, not a path.
// Reject path- and option-like values (and NUL, which would truncate on
// exec) rather than trying to sanitize them.
func acceptEnvPair(kv string) bool {
k, _, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "=")
k, v, ok := strings.Cut(kv, "=")
if !ok || isDangerousEnvVar(k) || forbiddenEnvKey(k) {
return false
}
return k == "TERM" || k == "LANG" || strings.HasPrefix(k, "LC_")
if strings.Contains(v, "\x00") {
return false
}
if k == "TERM" {
return !strings.Contains(v, "/")
}
if k == "LANG" || strings.HasPrefix(k, "LC_") {
return !strings.Contains(v, "/") && !strings.HasPrefix(v, "-")
}
return false
}
func fileExists(path string) bool {
+17
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@@ -1284,6 +1284,23 @@ func TestAcceptEnvPair(t *testing.T) {
{"LC_FOO=x", true},
{"LD_PRELOAD=naah", false},
{"TERM=screen-256color", true},
{"TERM=xterm-256color", true},
// TERM is a capability name, not a path.
{"TERM=a/b", false},
// Locale names reach root su/login environments where glibc treats
// path-like values as locale-data paths and leading dashes as its
// own options.
{"LANG=en_US.UTF-8", true},
{"LANG=../..", false},
{"LANG=../../x", false},
{"LANG=/x", false},
{"LANG=-x", false},
{"LC_FOO=-x", false},
{"LC_FOO=en_US", true},
{"LC_FOO=a/b", false},
// NUL would truncate on exec.
{"TERM=x\x00y", false},
{"LANG=x\x00y", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
if got := acceptEnvPair(tt.in); got != tt.want {