Files
worldwideview/scripts
Silvertakana 8a8165eeea fix(camera): camera proxy display + iframe sandbox hardening (#194)
* fix(camera): fix camera stream not displaying — CSP frame-ancestors and HTTP SSRF block

- next.config.ts: add path-scoped header override for /api/camera/proxy/:path*
  setting frame-ancestors 'self' and X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN so proxy iframe
  responses are not blocked by the global frame-ancestors 'none' policy
- ssrf.ts: extend validateOrigin to accept http:// URLs; the stream proxy is a
  server-side bridge that must fetch plain-HTTP camera feeds before re-serving
  them over HTTPS to the browser to avoid mixed-content blocks
- ssrf.spec.ts: update validateOrigin tests to match new HTTP-allowed behaviour;
  add explicit rejection tests for ftp://, file://, data://, javascript://
- scripts/boot-db.mjs: create .env from .env.example in worktrees when missing
  so DATABASE_URL injection block is never silently skipped

* fix(camera): sandbox proxied iframes and unblock external stylesheets

The CSP override for /api/camera/proxy/:path* still inherited the app's
restrictive style-src/script-src, which blocked external stylesheets and
scripts inside proxied iframes (YouTube, third-party players, etc).
Relax proxy CSP to default-src * while keeping frame-ancestors 'self'.

Because the proxy iframe is same-origin with the host app, this widened
CSP would have let upstream HTML reach window.parent.localStorage / DOM.
Add sandbox="allow-scripts allow-popups allow-presentation" (no
allow-same-origin) to proxied iframes so they run in an opaque origin
and cannot touch the host app. Major-platform iframes (YouTube/Twitch/
Vimeo) bypass the proxy and remain unsandboxed since the browser already
isolates them via cross-origin.

- next.config.ts: proxy CSP -> default-src * 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' data: blob:; frame-ancestors 'self'
- CameraStream.tsx: add sandbox attribute to proxied (non-major-platform) iframes
2026-05-26 16:43:24 +12:00
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