Phase 32 of v1.5 MCP Public-Launch Hardening (SEC-01..04):
- SEC-01: require a dedicated API_KEY_HMAC_SECRET in cloud/demo editions;
getSigningKey fails closed if it is unset or equal to AUTH_SECRET.
Local dev keeps the AUTH_SECRET fallback.
- SEC-02: Redis-backed per-key sliding-window rate limit (120/60s) applied
after auth, returns JSON-RPC -32000 / HTTP 429, fails open on Redis outage
behind the existing per-IP pre-auth gate.
- SEC-03: derive client IP from the trusted-proxy (rightmost X-Forwarded-For)
hop with an optional WWV_TRUSTED_IP_HEADER override, defeating spoofing.
- SEC-04: length + charset bounds on entityId/pluginId/layerId/name/notes
(shared identifierSchemas) and in isValidGlobeCommand; favorites capped at
500 per user.
Consolidates id schemas, extracts MCP response helpers, accurate Retry-After,
unique sliding-window members. Minor semver bump: adds new guardrails.